0008: Own nftables table; inbound via adapters (D-008)
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ADR-0008: Own nftables table; inbound via adapters (D-008)
Section titled “ADR-0008: Own nftables table; inbound via adapters (D-008)”- Status: Accepted
- Date: 2026-11-01
- Related: ADR-0007, ADR-0009
Context
Section titled “Context”Inbound firewall must respect the distro’s manager (firewalld, ufw) so users keep their native tools and semantics. Outbound enforcement and DNS guarding need nftables rules that survive other tools’ reloads.
Options considered
Section titled “Options considered”- Write into firewalld’s/ufw’s tables: overwritten on reload; breaks user expectations; explicitly forbidden by product rules.
- Replace the manager (own stack only): hostile to distro integration; loses zones/services semantics.
- Own table + adapters (chosen).
Decision
Section titled “Decision”The core is the single owner of table inet ibexwall. Plugins contribute
fragments (chains and sets prefixed by their id); the core composes the
table and applies it atomically through the nftables JSON API
(libnftables/nft -j), validating with nft -c first. Native tables of
other tools are never touched.
Inbound firewall goes through adapters: firewalld (D-Bus), ufw (CLI with fixed argv, no shell) and a bare “basic inbound protection” chain in our own table for distros without a manager.
Consequences
Section titled “Consequences”- Coexistence with Docker/libvirt/VPNs must be tested continuously (matrix in CI from F5).
- Two sources of truth (adapter state + our view) require drift detection and “adopt or reapply” flows.
- The bare-nftables adapter gives a consistent fallback everywhere.